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A Monumental Task: How Should Courts Review 
Challenges to Presidential Actions Taken 
Pursuant to the Antiquities Act? 
Bryan Mette 
  INTRODUCTION   
FOR THE BENEFIT AND ENJOYMENT OF THE PEO-
PLE.1 This simple, yet powerful phrase adorning the Roosevelt 
Arch—the gateway to Yellowstone National Park, America’s 
first national park2—embodies the country’s beliefs about its 
public lands. This ideal springs from the notion that our public 
lands are owned in common by the people and for the people. 
Consequently, an integral part of our public lands’ heritage is a 
focus on conserving their beauty and splendor for future genera-
tions. To aid the goals of conservation and protection of unique 
cultural, historic, scientific, and geographic sites throughout the 
nation,3 Congress passed the Antiquities Act of 1906.4 This law 
authorizes the President to designate certain sites on federally 
owned lands as national monuments, provided they meet specific 
statutory criteria.5 Presidents have certainly taken advantage of 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you 
to the editors and staff members of the Minnesota Law Review whose diligent 
efforts greatly improved this Note. Special thanks to my family, especially my 
mother and father, whose support and devotion these past twenty-eight years 
paved the way for me to be in the position I am today. I am forever indebted. 
Finally, I dedicate this piece to past generations who had the foresight to pre-
serve our national treasures for the countless generations to follow and to Roger 
Wagner, the great Alaskan explorer. Copyright © 2019 by Bryan Mette. 
 1. See Courtney Holden, Roosevelt Arch at Yellowstone’s North Entrance, 
YELLOWSTONEPARK.COM (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.yellowstonepark.com/ 
park/roosevelt-arch [https://perma.cc/X96J-V24K] (describing the arch and its 
inscription). 
 2. Id.  
 3. See infra Part I.A.2.  
 4. Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225. 
 5. Id. 
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this power, designating more than 158 national monuments 
throughout every corner of the country.6  
Despite our country’s strong legacy of protecting priceless 
public lands, in late 2017, President Donald Trump significantly 
reduced the boundaries of national monuments designated by 
Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama.7 These monu-
ments—both located in Utah—were Grand Staircase-Escalante8 
and Bears Ears.9 Although some parties supported this action,10 
others rejected it and filed suit, claiming that by reducing previ-
ous monument designations, Trump exceeded his authority un-
der the Antiquities Act.11 The primary conflict between the two 
camps hinges on whether the Act’s delegation of the authority to 
designate national monuments includes the power to reduce or 
revoke a prior monument designation.12 The academic debate 
over this question is fierce.13  
Although this Note focuses on determining how courts 
should review challenges to presidential monument actions gen-
erally, part of its inquiry necessarily includes how courts should 
 
 6. See Monuments List, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/ 
archeology/sites/antiquities/MonumentsList.htm  
[https://perma.cc/57ZQ-FCH8].  
 7. Julie Turkewitz, Trump Slashes Size of Bears Ears and Grand Stair-
case Monuments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/ 
04/us/trump-bears-ears.html [https://perma.cc/SZT8-3K5U]. 
 8. Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 4, 2017).  
 9. Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 4, 2017).  
 10. For example, the governor of Utah wrote an opinion piece backing the 
reduction of Bears Ears. Gary Herbert, Gary Herbert: 5 Myths About Bears Ears, 
DESERET NEWS (Dec. 4, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/ 
865693641/Gary-Herbert-5-myths-about-Bears-Ears.html 
[https://perma.cc/E8D9-DUBV]. 
 11. At least five suits were quickly filed in response to Trump’s action. See 
Andrew M. Harris, Patagonia Sues Trump over Bears Ears Monument, BLOOM-
BERG (Dec. 7, 2017, 10:38 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017 
-12-07/apparel-maker-patagonia-sues-trump-over-bears-ears-monument 
[https://perma.cc/VE7P-C6FA].  
 12. For an overview of the arguments concerning whether the President 
lacks the power to reduce or revoke preexisting monuments, see Mark Squillace 
et al., Presidents Lack the Authority To Abolish or Diminish National Monu-
ments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2017). But see John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, 
Presidential Authority To Revoke or Reduce National Monument Designations, 
35 YALE J. ON REG. 617 (2018) (arguing in favor of the position that the Presi-
dent’s Antiquities Act powers also include the authority to reduce or revoke na-
tional monuments).  
 13. See supra note 12. 
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review monument reductions or revocations.14 An important 
question thus arises: Is the same deference given to the reduc-
tion or revocation of a monument as is given to the President’s 
discretion with regard to designations?15 And if it is, should it 
be? This inquiry is particularly timely, not only because of the 
current litigation regarding Trump’s actions,16 but also because 
of the other national monuments potentially on the chopping 
block.17  
Part I of this Note explores the history surrounding national 
monument designations, including background on the Antiqui-
ties Act and how various Presidents have utilized the law. Part 
I also examines the framework courts employ in reviewing exec-
utive actions that are allegedly at odds with Congress’s will. Part 
II explores how some of the examples of presidential national 
monument designations discussed in Part I sparked litigation 
and how courts have failed to settle on a consistent standard of 
 
 14. See infra Part III.C. 
 15. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 (1994) (finding that it is im-
proper for the judiciary to review an action exercised by another branch when 
discretion has been committed to that branch in regard to that action). 
 16. Thomas Burr, Judge Consolidates Lawsuits over Bears Ears, Grand 
Staircase Monument Changes, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www 
.sltrib.com/news/politics/2018/01/31/judge-consolidates-lawsuits-over-bears 
-ears-grand-staircase-monument-changes/ [https://perma.cc/K5U8-FF32] (not-
ing that several lawsuits were filed in response to Trump’s reduction of Bears 
Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante).  
 17. Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017) (requiring 
the Interior Secretary to “conduct a review of all Presidential designations or 
expansions of designations under the Antiquities Act made since January 1, 
1996, where the designation covers more than 100,000 acres, where the desig-
nation after expansion covers more than 100,000 acres, or where the Secretary 
determines that the designation or expansion was made without adequate pub-
lic outreach and coordination with relevant stakeholders”). This directive re-
sulted in Secretary Ryan K. Zinke reviewing twenty-two national monuments 
and five marine national monuments. See RYAN K. ZINKE, FINAL REPORT SUM-
MARIZING FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW OF DESIGNATIONS UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES 
ACT 5–6 (2017), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/revised_final_ 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPX8-3TW8]. Besides the Bears Ears and Grand 
Staircase-Escalante reductions, Zinke expressed support for reducing other na-
tional monuments including Gold Butte in Nevada and Cascade-Siskiyou along 
the Oregon-California border. Valerie Volcovici, Interior Secretary Urges Size 
Cuts, Management Changes to More Monuments, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2017, 
1:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-monuments/interior 
-secretary-urges-size-cuts-management-changes-to-more-monuments-
idUSKBN1DZ2SV [https://perma.cc/24XJ-J4RG]. Zinke also raised the prospect 
of altering the boundaries of two marine national monuments located in the 
Pacific Ocean: the Pacific Remote Islands and Rose Atoll. Id.  
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review in these challenges. Part III concludes by proposing that 
Congress should pass a statutory remedy to guide courts on how 
to review a President’s discretionary action taken pursuant to 
the Antiquities Act. 
I.  EXPLORING THE HISTORY OF NATIONAL MONUMENT 
DESIGNATIONS   
Beginning with the passage of the Antiquities Act, this Part 
traces the evolution of the President’s designation power under 
the Act by examining some of the most famous (and contentious) 
presidential monument designations. This exercise demon-
strates how various administrations, through increasingly bold 
actions that tested the limits of Congress’s delegation, altered 
conceptions of presidential power pursuant to the Act. It then 
examines several cases—generally expounding upon presiden-
tial authority—that are relevant to the issues of executive power 
arising under the Act. 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT  
This Section begins by providing a brief background on fed-
eral public lands law, including its constitutional underpinnings. 
It also includes a description of what prompted the need for the 
Antiquities Act. It then transitions to a brief discussion of the 
legislative history and text of the Act.  
1. The Property Clause  
As a bedrock principle, the Framers imbued the Constitu-
tion with the separation of powers.18 A necessary component of 
this ideal is that the three branches of government—the execu-
tive,19 judicial,20 and legislative21—are each assigned powers to 
exercise. Among the multitude of powers granted to the various 
 
 18. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and ju-
diciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many . . . may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).  
 19. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2 (granting the President the 
power, among others, to act as commander in chief of the nation’s armed forces, 
make treaties, and appoint Supreme Court justices).  
 20. See, e.g., id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (authorizing the Supreme Court to hear 
cases and controversies involving the United States, ambassadors, and disputes 
between states).  
 21. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress powers, including to impose 
taxes, regulate interstate commerce, and establish post offices).  
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branches, the Constitution authorized Congress “to dispose of 
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the terri-
tory or other property belonging to the United States.”22 This 
power—enumerated in what is colloquially called the Property 
Clause—has been described as one “without limitations.”23 And 
from this power flows Congress’s authority to pass laws relating 
to lands the federal government owns and how those lands 
should be administered.24 
Initially, the impetus for assigning this power to the federal 
government was borne out of debates occurring around the for-
mation of the Constitution. Due to land-boundary disputes 
among the original states and inadequacies for land disposition 
present in the Articles of Confederation,25 the Framers intended 
to grant Congress a broad power to set the rules for federally 
owned public lands.26 Using this power, Congress has passed 
laws dealing with various aspects of public lands for purposes 
commonly associated with federal land policy, such as designat-
ing wilderness areas and national parks,27 formulating rules for 
timber sales in national forests,28 and even protecting wild 
horses and burros.29 As these examples demonstrate, the scope 
 
 22. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  
 23. United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 
(1940).  
 24. See id. at 29–30.  
 25. See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The 
Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 18–19 (2001); see also id. at 27 (“Madison argued that a chief weakness of the 
Articles stemmed from the lack of a power analogous to that conferred by the 
Property Clause.”). 
 26. See id. at 26 (noting that the records of the Constitutional Convention 
are unclear as to the extent of the power the Framers intended to bequeath to 
Congress but that they likely intended for Congress to exercise “broad author-
ity” in federal land policy and “not simply the power to dispose of federal prop-
erty”).  
 27. See, e.g., Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2012) (allow-
ing for the designation of wilderness areas); Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 42 
Stat. 32 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)) (establishing Yellowstone 
National Park). 
 28. See 16 U.S.C. § 472a(a).  
 29. See Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331–1340. Notably, a challenge to this act led the U.S. Supreme Court to 
reiterate once more that “[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to 
Congress is without limitations.” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 
(1976) (quoting United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. at 
29).  
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of Congress’s public-lands power is wide-ranging. It is within 
this authority that Congress relied on its broad powers under the 
Property Clause to pass the Antiquities Act of 1906.30 
2. The Need for the Antiquities Act  
Prior to passage of the Antiquities Act, the looting, vandal-
ism, and destruction of unique and important archaeological 
sites was an acute problem—particularly in the southwestern 
United States.31 Various proposals were put forth to protect pre-
cious national artifacts on federal lands.32 One such proposal, 
authored by Congressman Jonathan Dolliver of Iowa in 1900, 
authorized the President to withdraw public lands containing 
culturally significant manmade artifacts, such as cave dwellings 
and burial mounds, as well as “any natural formation of scien-
tific or scenic value of interest, or natural wonder or curiosity.”33 
Although this sweeping language was not adopted, it provided 
the foundation for a bill proposed by Representative John Lacey 
of Iowa later that year. It was this bill that included language 
that was eventually incorporated into the Antiquities Act.34 In 
particular, this language authorized the President to withdraw 
lands to protect “objects of scientific or historic interest.”35  
Several years later, on June 8, 1906, Congress passed this 
language, along with a broad grant of authority to the President 
to designate national monuments, in the Antiquities Act.36 De-
spite its sweeping language and large delegation of authority 
from Congress to the President, the Act itself was surprisingly 
short. Comprised of four sections, the Act laid out a scheme for 
protecting public lands that contained unique cultural, historic, 
and scientific objects.37 The first section provided for criminal 
penalties applicable to any person found to “appropriate, exca-
 
 30. Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225.  
 31. Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 
37 GA. L. REV. 473, 477 (2003) (recounting how archaeologists wanted to protect 
native artifacts by preventing the looting of these items from sites in the South-
west United States). For example, Squillace notes that sites like Chaco Canyon 
in northwest New Mexico and Mesa Verde (now a national park) in southwest 
Colorado were threatened by private collectors of cultural artifacts. Id. 
 32. Id. at 478–79.  
 33. Id. (quoting H.R. 8066, 56th Cong. (1900)).  
 34. See id. at 480 (citing H.R. 11,021, 58th Cong. § 1 (1900)).  
 35. Id. (quoting H.R. 11,021, 58th Cong. § 1 (1900)). 
 36. Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225.  
 37. Id.  
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vate, injure, or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monu-
ment, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or con-
trolled by the Government of the United States.”38 The third sec-
tion included a provision permitting the excavation of 
withdrawn sites for educational or scientific purposes if author-
ized by the agency in charge of managing the monument.39 The 
fourth section authorized the agency head in charge of adminis-
tering a national monument to engage in administrative rule-
making “for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the 
Act.”40  
However, it is the Act’s second section—providing the sub-
stantive delegation of power from Congress to the President—
that features prominently in this Note. In authorizing the Pres-
ident to withdraw federal lands, that section stated:  
That the President of the United States is hereby authorized, in his 
discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, his-
toric and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scien-
tific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by 
the Government of the United States to be national monuments, and 
may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all 
cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper 
care and management of the objects to be protected . . . .41 
It is this seemingly innocuous language that sparked litiga-
tion as well as a robust academic debate regarding how Presi-
dents have exercised their monument-designation power under 
the Antiquities Act and what the limitations (if any) on that 
power are. 
3. Scope of the Antiquities Act 
Congress passed the Antiquities Act in response to calls for 
the protection of unique archaeological artifacts.42 And there is 
good evidence that this was its primary purpose. During a debate 
in the House of Representatives on the bill that became the An-
tiquities Act, its sponsor—Representative Lacey—responded to 
questioning from a Texas Congressman who was concerned 
about large land withdrawals akin to previous vast withdrawals 
for forest reserves: 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 477–78.  
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Representative Lacey: There has been an effort made to have national 
parks in some of these regions, but this will merely make small reser-
vations where the objects are of sufficient interest to preserve them. 
Representative Stephens: Will that take this land off the market, or 
can they still be settled on as part of the public domain? 
Representative Lacey: It will take that portion of the reservation out of 
the market. It is meant to cover the cave dwellers and cliff dwellers. 
Representative Stephens: How much land will be taken off the market 
in the Western States by the passage of the bill? 
Representative Lacey: Not very much. The bill provides that it shall be 
the smallest area necesstry [sic] for the care and maintenance of the 
objects to be preserved.43 
The exchange between the two seems to have enunciated 
that the legislation was limited in scope in two ways: (1) in the 
types of sites it was intended to protect and (2) in the size of na-
tional monuments themselves. Considering that the assurances 
of restraint came from the bill’s sponsor, the House exchange 
certainly provides ammunition for critics of presidential monu-
ment designations44 that the Act was never intended to provide 
a basis for the wholesale withdrawal of millions of acres of fed-
eral lands. Instead, they argue, it was intended to be used in a 
targeted fashion to protect discrete parcels of land.45  
Notwithstanding this legislative history, the Act’s text must 
be considered as well.46 Indeed, some members of the federal ju-
diciary eschew legislative history in analyzing a statute due to a 
 
 43. 40 CONG. REC. 7888 (June 5, 1906). Titles of the representatives have 
been modified to improve readability. 
 44. CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41330, NATIONAL 
MONUMENTS AND THE ANTIQUITIES ACT 5 (2016) (“[Critics] charge that Con-
gress intended the act to protect specific items of interest, especially archaeo-
logical sites and the small areas surrounding them.”). But see id. (“Defenders 
observe that by not specifically capping the size of monument designations, the 
Antiquities Act gives the President discretion to determine the acreage neces-
sary to ensure protection of the resources in question, which can be a particular 
archaeological site or larger features or resources.”).  
 45. See Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 12, at 625 (“[T]he Antiquities Act’s title, 
drafting history, and historical context provide powerful additional evidence 
that the Act was not intended to allow vast scenic or geological monuments.”); 
cf. NICOLAS D. LORIS, HERITAGE FOUND., THE ANTIQUATED ACT: TIME TO RE-
PEAL THE ANTIQUITIES ACT 2 (2015) (calling for the repeal of the Antiquities Act 
and noting that Presidents have withdrawn millions of acres for national mon-
uments despite language in the Act calling for designations to be limited to the 
“smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects 
to be protected”).  
 46. As Justice Kagan has remarked, “I think we’re all textualists now.” 
Harvard Law Sch., The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the 
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purported lack of reliability.47 It is notable that the enacted law 
did not include discrete limitations on monument size despite 
calls for such restrictions.48 Rather than limit the Act’s scope to 
the withdrawal of small parcels of land to protect particular ar-
chaeological artifacts, the Act’s actual text is an open-ended 
grant of authority reflective of Congress’s desire to provide the 
President the flexibility needed to protect our national treas-
ures—whether they be historic or scientific, man-made or natu-
ral.49 Scholars who have studied this law in great detail have 
come to a similar conclusion.50 
B. HOW HAVE PRESIDENTS ACTUALLY UTILIZED THEIR 
DESIGNATION POWERS UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES ACT? 
Regardless of what Congress’s original conception of the An-
tiquities Act was, it is clear that Presidents have utilized this 
law to designate national monuments on a grand scale. Except 
for Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, every 
President since Theodore Roosevelt (who signed the original bill 
into law) has utilized the Act to designate monuments of varying 
sizes with differing rationales for their designations.51  
 
Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg. 
 47. See Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the 
Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1333, 1342 n.45 (2002) (noting that some 
Supreme Court justices, like Justice Thomas and the late Justice Scalia, have 
been skeptical of using legislative history in interpreting a statute). 
 48. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 483. Although earlier bills contained 
explicit size limits (such as 320 or 640 acres) on national monument designa-
tions, the Act did not hem in the President’s authority to withdraw lands but 
instead included more general language that introduced an element of discre-
tion in the scope of withdrawals. That language required withdrawals to be “the 
smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects 
to be protected.” Id.  
 49. See id. at 486 (“Legislative history and congressional intent aside, the 
plain language of the Antiquities Act supports a broad construction of the Pres-
ident’s authority to protect large tracts of land. The plain language of the Act, 
more than any legislative history, is likely to ensure judicial support for Antiq-
uities Act proclamations that protect large landscapes arguably relevant to sci-
ence and history.”).  
 50. Id.  
 51. VINCENT, supra note 44, at 2 n.11. In 2018, Trump designated his first 
national monument. Proclamation No. 9811, 83 Fed. Reg. 54,845 (Oct. 31, 2018) 
(Camp Nelson National Monument).  
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As the President who signed the Antiquities Act into law, 
Theodore Roosevelt quickly imprinted his larger-than-life per-
sonality52 onto the process for designating national monuments. 
Roosevelt designated America’s first national monument on Sep-
tember 24, 1906—Devil’s Tower National Monument in Crook 
County, Wyoming.53 The proclamation announcing this new 
monument was relatively short. It began with a brief recitation 
of section two of the Act as well as the rationale for designation.54 
This rationale described how Devil’s Tower had unique geologi-
cal features, which consequently made it “an object of historic 
and great scientific interest.”55 The proclamation then demar-
cated the site’s boundaries and barred unauthorized persons 
from looting or otherwise destroying any natural feature of the 
monument and settling on the land.56 The monument was 
slightly smaller than 1,200 acres.57  
Including Devil’s Tower, Roosevelt established eighteen na-
tional monuments in total, with Congress eventually incorporat-
ing several into national parks.58 However, it was the designa-
tion of one monument in particular that redefined the scope of 
 
 52. Overcome with grief after the death of his wife and mother on the same 
day, Roosevelt subsequently took up ranching in the Badlands of western North 
Dakota. Theodore Roosevelt the Rancher, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps 
.gov/thro/learn/historyculture/theodore-roosevelt-the-rancher.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/JM7L-KT62]. Battling the harsh environment of this country, he 
founded two ranches and lived out his idea of the “strenuous life.” Id. For an 
account of Roosevelt’s vision of the strenuous life, see THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 
The Strenuous Life: Speech Before the Hamilton Club, Chicago, April 10, 1899, 
in THE STRENUOUS LIFE 3, 21–22 (1901), https://www.bartleby.com/58/1.html 
[https://perma.cc/3T8T-EHX3] (“I preach to you, then, my countrymen, that our 
country calls not for the life of ease but for the life of strenuous en-
deavor . . . . Above all, let us shrink from no strife, moral or physical, within or 
without the nation, provided we are certain that the strife is justified, for it is 
only through strife, through hard and dangerous endeavor, that we shall ulti-
mately win the goal of true national greatness.”). The area where his ranches 
once stood is now home to Theodore Roosevelt National Park, Elkhorn Ranch 
Unit, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://nps.gov/thro/planyourvisit/elkhorn-ranch-unit 
.htm [https://perma.cc/5SPY-7A2P], a fitting tribute to a great champion of pub-
lic lands in America.  
 53. Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (Sept. 24, 1906). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 3237.  
 57. Monuments List, supra note 6.  
 58. The national monuments established by Roosevelt that were incorpo-
rated into national parks include: Petrified Forest and Grand Canyon in Ari-
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presidential powers under the Antiquities Act and eventually in-
stigated litigation challenging that power.59 
1. Grand Canyon National Monument 
Whatever size limitations Congress may have had in mind 
with the Antiquities Act were tossed aside when Roosevelt made 
his revolutionary designation of Grand Canyon National Monu-
ment on January 11, 190860—a monument that encompassed al-
most 810,000 acres in Arizona.61  
Like his first designation, the proclamation establishing the 
monument was relatively brief, merely consisting of a few para-
graphs in the Statutes at Large.62 In justifying the withdrawal, 
the proclamation remarked that the Grand Canyon was an “ob-
ject of unusual scientific interest” because it was the “greatest 
eroded canyon within the United States.”63 The withdrawal pro-
hibited utilizing the monument for any uses permitted by “public 
land laws” and barred settlement within the monument’s bound-
aries.64 Notably, the proclamation stated the designation in-
cluded the Grand Canyon as well as “such other land as is nec-
essary for its proper protection.”65 This language suggests that 
Roosevelt’s designation of lands outside the canyon was a nod to 
compliance with the Act’s “smallest area compatible” require-
ment for protected sites.66  
Notwithstanding his protection of the Grand Canyon, Roo-
sevelt’s designation brought forth litigation challenging his au-
thority to reserve such a large tract of land. Although there were 
a number of issues in that case, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 
brief analysis, concluded the withdrawal was within the purview 
of the President’s powers under the Antiquities Act.67 
 
zona; Cinder Cone, Lassen Peak, and Pinnacles in California; and Mount Olym-
pus in Washington. Id.  
 59. See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the litigation sparked by the 
Grand Canyon designation.  
 60. Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (Jan. 11, 1908). 
 61. Monuments List, supra note 6. 
 62. Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. See Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225. 
 67. See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455–56 (1920). This case 
is discussed further in Part II.  
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2. Jackson Hole National Monument 
Another national monument designation that spurred con-
troversy68 was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) 
withdrawal of lands to create Jackson Hole National Monu-
ment.69 The monument, located in Wyoming, covered 221,610 
acres in the Teton Country.70 The presidential proclamation was, 
like its predecessors, limited in its justification for creating the 
monument: in seventy-eight words, the proclamation merely re-
cited a portion of the language from section two of the Act, de-
claring that the Jackson Hole country “contain[ed] historic land-
marks and other objects of historic and scientific interest.”71 
Although the lands that encompassed Jackson Hole National 
Monument were eventually incorporated into Grand Teton Na-
tional Park72—one of the most visited and popular national 
parks in the country73—support for federal protection of this 
land at the time of designation was fractured. Wyoming politi-
cians in particular opposed FDR’s Jackson Hole withdrawal.74 
Opposition from Wyomingites was strong enough that Congress 
eventually passed one of the few restrictions on the President’s 
power to withdraw lands under the Antiquities Act.75 That re-
striction, part of a larger bill to incorporate Jackson Hole Na-
tional Monument into Grand Teton National Park, required 
“[t]hat no further extension or establishment of national parks 
 
 68. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 498.  
 69. Proclamation No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (Mar. 15, 1943). 
 70. Squillace, supra note 31, at 495.  
 71. Proclamation No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (Mar. 15, 1943). 
 72. 16 U.S.C. § 406d-1 (2012) (incorporating Jackson Hole National Monu-
ment into Grand Teton National Park).  
 73. In 2018, Grand Teton National Park was the eighth most visited park, 
receiving nearly 3.5 million visitors. See These Are the 10 Most Popular National 
Parks, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/ 
travel/national-parks/most-visited-parks-photos/  
[https://perma.cc/Y4BE-2J9B].  
 74. See generally A Bill To Abolish the Jackson Hole National Monument 
as Created by Presidential Proclamation Numbered 2578, Dated March 15, 
1943, and to Restore the Area Embraced Within and Constituting Said Monu-
ment to Its Status as Part of the Teton National Forest: Hearings on H.R. 2241 
Before the H. Comm. on the Pub. Lands, 78th Cong. (1943) (featuring Wyoming 
Congressman Frank Barrett criticizing the monument). 
 75. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(d) (2012). The other restriction on the President’s 
power to withdraw lands occurred in response to Jimmy Carter’s reservation of 
millions of acres in Alaska. See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.  
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or monuments in Wyoming may be undertaken except by ex-
press authorization of the Congress.”76  
This reassertion of Congress’s plenary power under the 
Property Clause to “make all needful rules and regulations re-
specting . . . property belonging to the United States”77 provides 
evidence for the notion that Congress is capable and willing to 
cabin the President’s designation power when that body believes 
the Executive Branch has misused it. It is notable, however, that 
Congress, in its rejoinder to the Jackson Hole monument, did not 
grant new executive powers to revoke or diminish an existing 
designation. Perhaps Congress did not want to wade into a dis-
pute that was already well worn: a 1938 opinion by then-Attor-
ney General Homer Cummings maintained that the President 
lacked the power to outright abolish a previously designated na-
tional monument.78 In addition to the legislative response it 
aroused, the Jackson Hole withdrawal also prompted a lawsuit 
challenging the President’s authority to designate the site.79 
3. Alaskan National Monuments 
Except for one day midway through his presidency, Jimmy 
Carter refrained from using his authority to designate national 
monuments.80 But his actions on that day, declaring a number 
of new and enlarged national monuments, dramatically altered 
the scope of the President’s authority under the Antiquities 
Act—especially in regard to its “smallest area” requirement.81 
On December 1, 1978, Carter established or enlarged seventeen 
national monuments82 in Alaska covering more than fifty-six 
 
 76. An Act to Establish a New Grand Teton National Park in the State of 
Wyoming, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 81-787, § 1, 64 Stat. 849, 849 
(1950) (codified as amended at 54 U.S.C. § 320301(d) (2012)).  
 77. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 78. Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney National Monument, 39 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 185, 186 (1938). Interestingly, this opinion acknowledges that Presi-
dents had “from time to time” diminished national monuments in accordance 
with the “smallest area” requirement of the Antiquities Act but nonetheless held 
that any power to confine did not create a power to revoke. Id. at 188. But see 
Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 12, at 633–39 (arguing the Cummings opinion was 
flawed and legally incorrect).  
 79. Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945). This case is dis-
cussed in Part II. 
 80. See Monuments List, supra note 6 (listing the national monuments 
Carter created and their size).  
 81. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012). 
 82. See Monuments List, supra note 6. 
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million acres.83 With the stroke of a pen, he revolutionized pres-
idential authority pursuant to the Act much like his predecessor 
Theodore Roosevelt had done seventy years before.84 By redefin-
ing the scope of a monument’s size and the objects that a monu-
ment could protect,85 Carter essentially transformed the Act into 
a tool to accomplish general land and ecosystem conservation.86 
Ranging in size from the 350,000-acre designation of Aniakchak 
National Monument87 to the enormous 10,950,000-acre designa-
tion of Wrangell-St. Elias National Monument,88 these new na-
tional monuments in Alaska were stunning not only for their 
sheer scale but also for the objects that they protected. The aims 
of these designations included the preservation of various spe-
cies of wildlife, such as brown bears and bald eagles on Admi-
ralty Island in southeast Alaska,89 a unique fish species in 
Kobuk Valley,90 and a major caribou herd residing north of the 
Arctic Circle.91 Additionally, these monuments aimed to protect 
large-scale ecosystems, such as boreal forests, riparian lands, 
and tundra in the Gates of the Arctic National Monument.92 
 
 83. Squillace, supra note 31, at 502.  
 84. See Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President’s Statutory Pow-
ers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1, 39 (1982) (noting that Carter’s national monument desig-
nations exceeded in scale the designations of past Presidents under the Antiq-
uities Act); Richard M. Johannsen, Comment, Public Land Withdrawal Policy 
and the Antiquities Act, 56 WASH. L. REV. 439, 455 (1981) (noting that “Presi-
dent Carter withdrew over four and a half times as much public land as the 
total land withdrawn under the Antiquities Act by all prior Presidents in sev-
enty-two years”); see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing Roosevelt’s significant 
designation of the Grand Canyon National Monument).  
 85. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (requiring monuments to protect “historic land-
marks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scien-
tific interest” in the “smallest area compatible with the proper care and man-
agement of the objects to be protected”). The monuments that Carter created 
also represented the largest land-based designations in the Antiquities Act’s 
history. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 502.  
 86. See Johannsen, supra note 84 (“There is little doubt that President 
Carter was acting outside the spirit of the Antiquities Act; the pattern of politi-
cal events indicates that the President used the Act as a general conservation 
measure rather than to protect particular ‘objects of historic or scientific inter-
est’ as required by the Act.” (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012)). 
 87. Proclamation No. 4612, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,013, 57,013 (Dec. 1, 1978). 
 88. Proclamation No. 4625, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,101, 57,102 (Dec. 1, 1978). 
 89. See Proclamation No. 4611, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,009, 57,009 (Dec. 1, 1978).  
 90. See Proclamation No. 4621, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,073, 57,073 (Dec. 1, 1978) 
(noting the rare presence of the Alaskan sheefish). 
 91. See Proclamation No. 4617, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,043, 57,043 (Dec. 1, 1978).  
 92. See, e.g., id.  
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These designations, however, were again not without con-
troversy. Many in Alaska vehemently opposed the new monu-
ments, claiming that Carter’s actions constituted an encroach-
ment by the federal government on locals’ rights.93 Tensions ran 
high among Alaskans, with several members of Alaska’s con-
gressional delegation declaring that the federal government was 
at war with the state.94 In response to Carter’s actions, many 
Alaskans engaged in acts of protest. Sportsmen’s groups coordi-
nated a gathering near Denali National Monument that aimed 
to violate a number of federal land regulations.95 One protestor 
in Fairbanks even burned an effigy of Carter.96 
Despite this opposition, Congress ultimately sanctioned 
Carter’s actions in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conser-
vation Act (ANILCA) of 198097 by adding his monument desig-
nations to the National Park Service,98 National Forest Sys-
tem,99 and National Wildlife Refuge System.100 However, 
ANILCA also codified another restriction on the President’s 
power to withdraw lands for national monuments.101 The rele-
vant language held that: “No future executive branch action 
which withdraws more than five thousand acres, in the aggre-
gate, of public lands within the State of Alaska shall be effective 
except by compliance with this subsection.”102 
 
 93. See Dermont Cole, Thirty-Five Years Ago, Carter Drew Wrath of Many 
Alaskans, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2013), https://www.adn.com/ 
commentary/article/thirty-five-years-ago-carter-drew-wrath-many-alaskans/ 
2013/12/01/ [https://perma.cc/U3J6-UJXX].  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371. 
 98. See id. § 201.  
 99. See id. § 503.  
 100. Id. § 302.  
 101. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (describing the re-
striction on creating new national monuments in Wyoming by presidential proc-
lamation).  
 102. 16 U.S.C. § 3213(a) (2012) (emphasis added). This statute goes on to 
permit the President to create Alaskan withdrawals of more than five thousand 
acres but holds that the “withdrawal shall not become effective until notice is 
provided in the Federal Register and to both Houses of Congress. Such with-
drawal shall terminate unless Congress passes a joint resolution of approval 
within one year after the notice of such withdrawal has been submitted to Con-
gress.” Id. This provision—granting Congress the ultimate authority to sanction 
such a withdrawal—may constitute an unconstitutional legislative veto. Cf. INS 
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Akin to the revocation of the President’s power to designate 
national monuments in Wyoming, Congress limited the Presi-
dent’s authority under the Act to designate national monuments 
in Alaska larger than five thousand acres without congressional 
approval.103 This law provides another example of Congress re-
stricting the President’s designation power while failing to ad-
dress his or her authority to revoke or reduce a monument des-
ignation.  
In designating the Alaskan national monuments, Carter 
protected large swaths of uniquely precious wilderness, pre-
served these lands, and prevented their degradation by mining, 
development, and other forms of landscape alteration. Yet, in do-
ing so, Carter used the Antiquities Act to a degree which dwarfed 
the monument designations of prior administrations.104 These 
monuments redefined the scope of the President’s withdrawal 
authority in terms of both monument size as well as the objects 
of scientific or historic interest which justified protection.105 As 
Part II demonstrates, federal courts would ultimately bless 
Carter’s expansion of presidential authority. Those decisions, 
along with precedent regarding judicial review of discretionary 
executive actions discussed below, validate the notion that 
courts are willing to defer (perhaps absolutely) to the President 
when a statute—like the Antiquities Act in its current form—
commits a decision to his or her discretion.  
C. CASE LAW ON THE SCOPE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ANTIQUITIES ACT 
To understand the monumental designation power dele-
gated to the President and how courts should review challenges 
to the use of that power, it is helpful to engage in an abbreviated 
overview of how courts review challenges to presidential actions 
taken pursuant to executive powers. Among other cases, this 
Section delves into one of the most influential cases regarding 
 
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (ruling that a legislative veto violates 
the Constitution’s Presentment Clause). 
 103. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.  
 104. See supra note 84. 
 105. See supra note 84. 
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presidential powers—Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer106—and, in particular, focuses on Justice Jackson’s concur-
rence.107 This Section then discusses federal jurisprudence re-
garding the relationship between presidential discretion and 
judicial review of challenges to the exercise of that discretion.  
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
In 1952, President Truman responded to a threatened na-
tionwide strike of steelworkers by ordering the Secretary of Com-
merce to commandeer and operate all U.S. steel mills.108 Relying 
on his powers as Commander in Chief, Truman argued his order 
was necessary because a disruption in steel production threat-
ened national security.109 In response, the owners of the affected 
steel mills brought suit and requested an injunction barring the 
Secretary from seizing the mills.110 These companies claimed 
that Truman overstepped the powers of the presidency by uncon-
stitutionally entering the realm of Congress’s lawmaking 
power.111 In an opinion penned by Justice Black, the Court 
agreed with the companies and determined that Truman ex-
ceeded his executive powers by treading upon Congress’s power 
to legislate.112 According to the Court, a presidential power 
“must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitu-
tion itself,”113 and because no law or constitutionally-granted ex-
ecutive power authorized the President to seize the mills, Tru-
man’s order was unconstitutional.114 
In addition to Justice Black’s opinion, each member of the 
majority penned a separate concurring opinion.115 Among these 
was Justice Jackson’s concurrence, where he laid out his view of 
 
 106. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  
 107. Id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 108. Id. at 582–83.  
 109. Id. at 583–84.  
 110. Id. at 583. 
 111. Id. at 583–84.  
 112. Id. at 589. In support of its decision, the Court remarked that “[t]he 
Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential 
or military supervision or control.” Id. at 588.  
 113. Id. at 585.  
 114. See id. at 587–89.  
 115. Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring). 
Unlike the other concurrences, Justice Clark only concurred in the judgment of 
the Court. Id. at 660 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment).  
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the three scenarios under which a President could engage in ex-
ecutive action and how a court should go about reviewing a chal-
lenge to such an action.116 According to the Court and scholars, 
this tripartite framework has become the dominant test for eval-
uating a challenge to an executive action.117 
Under the first scenario, “[w]hen the President acts pursu-
ant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his au-
thority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in 
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”118 According 
to Justice Jackson, in situations where Congress has authorized 
the President to take an action, the authorization is presump-
tively valid and should be given “the widest latitude of judicial 
interpretation.”119 Under this prong of Justice Jackson’s three-
part test, a challenge would be successful only if the federal gov-
ernment lacked the constitutional authority to undertake such 
an action in the first place.120 Accordingly, judicial review of such 
a challenge would seemingly be limited to a constitutional in-
quiry supported by the federal judiciary’s authority “to say what 
the law is”121 and void unconstitutional actions.122 
The second prong of Justice Jackson’s test applies to in-
stances where “the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority.”123 Under such a scenario, the 
President can only rely upon her independent executive powers 
as justification for an executive action.124 However, Justice Jack-
son noted that there may be “a zone of twilight in which [the 
President] and Congress may have concurrent authority” and in 
which “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence” may en-
able a President’s action.125  
 
 116. Id. at 635–38.  
 117. Laura A. Cisneros, Youngstown Sheet to Boumediene: A Story of Judi-
cial Ethos and the (Un)fastidious Use of Language, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 577, 578 
n.2 (2012) (summarizing the breadth of case law, statements by current Su-
preme Court justices, and academic literature that exalt Justice Jackson’s 
Youngstown concurrence as the standard for evaluating executive actions). 
 118. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 119. Id. at 637.  
 120. Id. at 636–37.  
 121. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
 122. Cf. id. at 180 (“[A] law repugnant to the constitution is void.”).  
 123. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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Under the third prong, the President’s power is at its “lowest 
ebb” when it conflicts with “the express or implied will of Con-
gress” because the President is only acting “upon his own consti-
tutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress 
over the matter.”126 It is in these types of scenarios that courts 
must engage in a judicial review which scrutinizes a President’s 
action in order to uphold the separation of powers and preserve 
the constitutional equilibrium among the three branches of the 
federal government.127 
2. Presidential Discretion and Judicial Review  
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), federal 
courts may hear challenges to agency actions that injure a 
party.128 Per the statute, when reviewing an agency action, “the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, inter-
pret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the 
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”129 No-
tably, however, an organic statute precludes judicial review of 
an agency action when it commits discretion to an agency in un-
dertaking that action.130 Similarly, when Congress “commits [a] 
decision to the discretion of the President,” the Supreme Court 
has held that challenges to the exercise of that discretion are 
outside the purview of the judiciary.131 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has also held that the President is not an agency as de-
fined by the APA, finding that: 
The President is not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview, but 
he is not explicitly included, either. Out of respect for the separation of 
powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find 
that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provi-
sions of the APA. We would require an express statement by Congress 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at 638.  
 128. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–702 (2012). 
 129. 5 U.S.C. § 706.  
 130. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); see also Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. FTC, 515 F.2d 
367, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Under the APA, judicial review of administrative 
action is the rule, unless there is a statutory prohibition of judicial review or 
unless agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” (citation omit-
ted)); Sugarman v. Forbragd, 405 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1968) (“By the terms 
of [the Administrative Procedure] Act, § 701(a)(2) . . . is not to apply where 
‘agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.’”). 
 131. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 (1994); see also id. at 476 (“How 
the President chooses to exercise the discretion Congress has granted him is not 
a matter for our review.”). 
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before assuming it intended the President’s performance of his statu-
tory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.132 
Taken as a whole, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence seems 
to suggest that discretionary actions that the President executes 
pursuant to a statute are beyond the scope of judicial review. 
However, this assertion of absolute deference to the Executive 
Branch is a point of disagreement among courts.133 Some courts 
forbid judicial review of a discretionary presidential action.134 In 
contrast, the D.C. Circuit has moved away, at least in part, from 
complete deference to a President’s exercise of discretion, noting 
that there are certain instances where the assumption that such 
an action is non-justiciable is misguided.135 For example, in 
Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Dalton v. Specter—precluding judi-
cial review of an executive action when Congress authorizes the 
President to exercise discretion136—was limited to instances 
“when a statute entrusts a discrete specific decision to the Pres-
ident and contains no limitations on the President’s exercise of 
that authority.”137 Thus, the natural corollary to this position is 
that when a statute cabins in the President’s discretion with at 
least some limitations on a delegated power, courts may review 
 
 132. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).  
 133. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 
1331–32 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (favoring, based on the circumstances, judicial review 
of the President’s discretionary decision); Utah Ass’n of Ctys. v. Bush, 316 F. 
Supp. 1172, 1183 (D. Utah 2004) (“Clearly established Supreme Court prece-
dent instructs that the Court’s judicial review in these circumstances is at best 
limited to ascertaining that the President in fact invoked his powers under the 
Antiquities Act. Beyond such a facial review the Court is not permitted to go. 
When the President is given such a broad grant of discretion as in the Antiqui-
ties Act, the courts have no authority to determine whether the President 
abused his discretion.” (citations omitted)).  
 134. See, e.g., Utah Ass’n of Ctys., 316 F. Supp. at 1183.  
 135. See Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1331–32 (finding that Dalton v. 
Specter’s reasoning that judicial review is barred when a statute authorizes the 
President to exercise discretion is limited to instances when the statute places 
“no limitations on the President’s exercise of that authority”); Roberto Iraola, 
Proclamations, National Monuments, and the Scope of Judicial Review Under 
the Antiquities Act of 1906, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 171 
n.51 (2004). 
 136. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 477 (“Where a statute . . . commits decisionmaking 
to the discretion of the President, judicial review of the President’s decision is 
not available.”).  
 137. Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1331 (emphasis added).  
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claims that allege an executive action violates those limita-
tions.138 In essence, these courts argue for the position that ab-
solute deference to a President’s discretionary action only occurs 
when there are no discernible limitations on the exercise of dis-
cretion.139  
As Part II demonstrates, all of this preceding authority is 
relevant to a discussion of judicial review in Antiquities Act chal-
lenges because the statute itself entrusts the decision to desig-
nate national monuments to the President’s discretion.140 Yet 
the Act also places limitations on the exercise of that discretion 
by enumerating that (1) only certain objects can be predicates for 
a national monument designation by the President,141 and (2) 
those monuments constitute the “smallest area compatible” with 
the protection of those objects.142 
Additionally, as Part III highlights, Congress’s implied dis-
agreement with a presidentially backed monument reduction or 
revocation—based on a provision tucked into the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976—implicates the third prong 
of Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework.143  
 
 138. See id. at 1332 (concluding that there are “judicially enforceable limita-
tions on presidential actions”).  
 139. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 477; Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1331. 
 140. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).  
 141. The Act authorizes the President to exercise his or her discretion to pro-
tect “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects 
of historic or scientific interest” that are worthy of monument status. Id. Ac-
cordingly, precedent suggests that decisions about which landmarks, struc-
tures, and objects to protect may be non-reviewable. See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 
4770. But see Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Cameron v. 
United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920). Although the Court in Cappaert and Cam-
eron was incredibly deferential to the President’s decision, it implicitly adopted 
the view that it could review challenges to the President’s use of discretion by 
analyzing whether the monument complied with the statute, rather than whole-
sale deferring to the President without any review. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142; 
Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455–56. However, it is important to note that these deci-
sions predated Dalton v. Specter, which called for judicial deference to the Pres-
ident’s exercise of discretion.  
 142. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b).  
 143. See infra notes 292–94 and accompanying text.  
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II.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL 
MONUMENT DESIGNATIONS   
Since Theodore Roosevelt’s administration, various Presi-
dents have utilized the Antiquities Act to designate new monu-
ments or expand existing ones to protect objects of historic, sci-
entific, and cultural significance.144 But many of these 
monument designations were controversial and generated legal 
challenges by aggrieved parties.145 With an eye towards identi-
fying the proper standard of judicial review for these challenges, 
this Part examines the types of claims that plaintiffs commonly 
make in cases predicated on alleged violations of the Antiquities 
Act and how courts have addressed them. It also demonstrates 
how federal courts have differed in reviewing challenges to na-
tional monument designations, which provides the impetus for 
the proposed solution in Part III to bring uniformity to judicial 
review in these cases. 
Section A begins by applying the principles of judicial review 
of presidential exercises of discretion generally to the Antiquities 
Act. Sections B through D explore cases from each level of the 
federal judiciary that involved challenges to national monu-
ments arising from controversial presidential monument desig-
nations—including several of the monuments discussed in 
Part I.  
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ANTIQUITIES ACT CHALLENGES 
According to Professor Mark Squillace, a key process ques-
tion in Antiquities Act cases remains unresolved.146 He notes 
that courts have struggled with the proper standard of review to 
employ when hearing challenges to national monument designa-
tions made pursuant to the Antiquities Act.147 Without guidance 
from the statute itself148 or the Supreme Court, a clear answer 
 
 144. See, e.g., Monuments List, supra note 6. 
 145. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 93. 
 146. Mark Squillace, The Looming Battle over the Antiquities Act, HARV. L. 
REV. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-looming-battle 
-over-the-antiquities-act/ [https://perma.cc/V2FX-95H3].  
 147. See id. 
 148. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2012); Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and 
the President’s Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1982) (noting the Antiq-
uities Act “contains no provision for judicial review”). 
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to this question has eluded lower federal courts.149 This is signif-
icant because, outside of two Supreme Court cases,150 disputes 
over national monument designations have occurred solely at 
the circuit and district court levels.151 Consequently, enunciating 
a standard of review may help to diminish the amount of litiga-
tion over national monument designations.  
Further complicating this inquiry, it is unclear whether a 
court even possesses the authority to review a challenged monu-
ment designation in the first place. The D.C. Circuit noted that 
it has had “no occasion to decide the ultimate question of the 
availability or scope of review for exceeding statutory authority” 
vis-à-vis Antiquities Act cases.152 More recently, in a challenge 
to Obama’s designation of Northeast Canyons and Seamounts 
Marine National Monument, a D.C. federal district court also 
declined to rule on the “availability and scope of review” for cer-
tain claims based on the Antiquities Act statutory require-
ments.153  
As Section I.C.2 demonstrated, to address the question of 
judicial review, we must answer whether the Antiquities Act 
grants the President unconstrained discretion in designating na-
tional monuments, or whether there are discernible limitations 
on his or her discretion under the monument-designation 
power.154 Parties interested in the subject are split. In the anti-
review camp are those who argue that the Supreme Court has 
clearly articulated that a President’s discretionary action cannot 
be reviewed by the courts and thus a President’s decision to des-
ignate national monument is unreviewable.155 This was the po-
 
 149. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1135 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never expressly discussed the scope of 
judicial review under the Antiquities Act.”).  
 150. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Cameron v. United 
States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920). 
 151. See infra Parts II.C–D. 
 152. See infra Parts II.C–D.  
 153. See Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Ross, 349 F. Supp. 3d 48, 55 (D.D.C. 
2018).  
 154. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 534–36 (describing several approaches 
to reviewing presidential monument designations); Squillace, supra note 146 
(describing the standard of review); see also Iraola, supra note 135, at 171 n.52 
(noting the approaches courts have used to review Antiquities Act challenges).  
 155. Brief for Federal Defendants at 8, Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n. v. Ross, 
No. 17-406 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2018) (asserting that “the President’s exercise of 
discretion under the Antiquities Act is not subject to judicial review”); id. at 1 
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sition taken by the federal government in its defense to the law-
suit challenging Obama’s designation of Northeast Canyons and 
Seamounts Marine National Monument.156  
In opposition to the absolute deference position are those 
who claim that such unrestrained executive power only exists 
when a statute places no limitations on the exercise of a Presi-
dent’s discretion.157 For example, one commentator argued that, 
“while [the Antiquities Act] grants the President broad discre-
tion, and separation of powers concerns are present, the statute 
also contains some restrictions. Judicial review ‘is available to 
ensure that the Proclamations are consistent with constitutional 
principles and that the President has not exceeded his statutory 
authority.’”158 
Which position should win the day? Unfortunately for advo-
cates of restraints on executive power, it seems more probable 
than not that the Supreme Court would withhold judicial review 
of a President’s exercise of discretion in designating a national 
monument, especially in regards to the first requirement con-
cerning objects eligible for protection.159 The language of this 
statutory provision is written in broad terms: landmarks, struc-
tures, and historic or scientific interest.160 These last two terms 
in particular—historic and scientific—are not amenable to 
bright line determinations about what objects fall under these 
categories. It seems appropriate that the President, with all the 
power that comes with leading and managing the vast resources 
of the U.S. government, is in a better position than the courts to 
understand which objects are worthy of protection. It also bears 
recognizing that the President, unlike federal judges, is directly 
accountable to the will of the people by virtue of the ballot box. 
Thus, he or she is undoubtedly better equipped to evaluate the 
political considerations, make the political decisions, and accept 
 
(“This Court cannot review how the President exercised the discretion that Con-
gress granted him to designate and define national monuments in the Antiqui-
ties Act.” (citing Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994); Tulare County v. Bush, 
306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002))).  
 156. See id. 
 157. See Iraola, supra note 135, at 171; supra notes 135–37 and accompany-
ing text. 
 158. Iraola, supra note 135, at 171 (quoting Mountain States Legal Found. 
v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).  
 159. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).  
 160. Id. 
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the political consequences which so often arise in national mon-
ument designations.161 
B. SUPREME COURT CASES INTERPRETING THE ANTIQUITIES 
ACT 
United States Supreme Court case law involving the Presi-
dent’s authority under the Antiquities Act is surprisingly thin. 
The Court has decided cases involving challenges to this author-
ity only twice162 since the Act was signed into law.163 In both 
cases, the Court upheld the monument designation as a valid 
exercise of presidential power under the Act.164 In neither case 
did the Supreme Court explicitly address the applicable stand-
ard of review.165 
1. Cameron v. United States 
The first case was Cameron v. United States.166 In Cameron, 
the bulk of the Court’s opinion focused on evaluating the appel-
lant’s mining claim affected by the Grand Canyon National Mon-
ument designation.167 Before it addressed this issue however, it 
conducted a cursory review of the president’s authority to desig-
nate the monument in the first place.168 It disagreed with the 
appellant’s argument that Theodore Roosevelt had exceeded his 
 
 161. For example, see supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text, which de-
scribes the backlash that Carter’s national monument designations in Alaska 
sparked in that state’s citizens. Additionally, see Squillace, supra note 31, at 
495–99, which details the controversy that followed FDR’s creation of Jackson 
Hole National Monument.  
 162. See Iraola, supra note 135, at 172–74. 
 163. The Court also considered a case involving the Antiquities Act in United 
States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978). However, that case did not involve a 
challenge to a presidential national monument designation on the grounds that 
the designation exceeded the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act. 
Rather, that case involved the question of who owned the submerged lands and 
waters within Channel Islands National Monument—California or the United 
States. Id. at 33. The court found in favor of California. Id.  
 164. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Cameron v. United 
States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920). 
 165. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128; Cameron, 252 U.S. 450. 
 166. 252 U.S. 450. 
 167. Id. at 456–65.  
 168. Id. at 455–56. 
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authority under the Act.169 For support, it cited the Act’s lan-
guage regarding “objects of historic or scientific interest”170 and 
then parroted the President’s assertion that the Grand Canyon 
was “an object of unusual scientific interest.”171 It also briefly 
described some of the Canyon’s characteristics to support its con-
clusion.172  
As it relates to the President’s authority under the Antiqui-
ties Act, the Court’s opinion in Cameron is notably brief. It is 
also notable for what it failed to explicitly discuss. The Court did 
not directly address whether it possessed the authority to review 
the President’s use of discretion in designating a monument.173 
Nor did it touch upon the standard of review it applied to appel-
lant’s challenge of the designation. It bears acknowledging that 
by evaluating whether the Grand Canyon was an object of scien-
tific interest, the Court implicitly assumed at least a limited au-
thority to review whether the President’s use of discretion in des-
ignating a monument comported with the Act’s requirement that 
a protected object be of “historic or scientific interest.”174 But its 
analysis of this issue was shallow and merely deferred to Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s assertion that the Grand Canyon qualified as 
the type of object contemplated by the Act.175 Thus, Cameron 
represents the first example of the Court granting considerable 
deference to the President’s discretion to designate a national 
monument—particularly in regards to whether an object quali-
fies for protection.  
2. Cappaert v. United States 
Besides Cameron, the most consequential Supreme Court 
case involving a challenge to the President’s use of the Antiqui-
ties Act occurred in Cappaert v. United States.176 The appellants 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).  
 171. Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455–56 (quoting Proclamation No. 794, 35 
Stat. 2175 (Jan. 11, 1908)). 
 172. Id. at 456 (“It is the greatest eroded canyon in the United States, if not 
in the world, is over a mile in depth, has attracted wide attention among explor-
ers and scientists, affords an unexampled field for geologic study, is regarded as 
one of the great natural wonders, and annually draws to its borders thousands 
of visitors.”).  
 173. Whether this issue of review was briefed or discussed at oral argument 
is unclear. 
 174. 54 U.S.C. § 320301.  
 175. Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455–56. 
 176. 426 U.S. 128 (1976). 
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in Cappaert challenged Truman’s addition of Devil’s Hole, “a 
deep limestone cavern in Nevada,”177 to the preexisting Death 
Valley National Monument.178 The crux of the case dealt with 
whether the addition of Devil’s Hole to the existing national 
monument reserved federal water rights in unappropriated wa-
ter within the site.179 But a minor issue in the case hinged on 
whether the President’s action violated the Antiquities Act. Spe-
cifically, the appellants challenged the President’s authority to 
designate pools like Devil’s Hole under the Act and argued that 
the designation power was limited to “archeologic sites.”180 In es-
sence, the appellants were challenging President Truman’s dis-
cretionary determination that the monument contained “objects 
of historic or scientific interest,” which came within the purview 
of the statute.181 
Like Cameron, the Court’s analysis of the appellant’s Antiq-
uities Act claim was brief and relied on Cameron as justification 
for rejecting the argument that the Act did not apply to sites like 
Devil’s Hole.182 But, unlike Cameron, the Court did not incorpo-
rate language from the presidential proclamation to justify its 
finding that the monument designation fell within the confines 
of the statute.183 Instead the Court engaged in simple statutory 
interpretation to conclude that “[t]he pool in Devil’s Hole and its 
rare inhabitants are ‘objects of historic or scientific interest.’”184  
Due to the brevity of the portion of the opinion addressing 
the Antiquities Act claim, the Court failed to explicitly address 
its authority to review the claim.185 But by analyzing whether 
the Act was limited to protecting archaeological sites, the Court 
seemingly implied at least a limited review power to determine 
 
 177. Id. at 131.  
 178. President Herbert Hoover first designated this monument on February 
11, 1933. Proclamation No. 2028, 47 Stat. 2554 (1933). Truman enlarged it to 
include Devil’s Hole in 1952. Proclamation No. 2961, 3 C.F.R § 147 (1949–1953).  
 179. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 131. 
 180. Id.  
 181. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).  
 182. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142 (citing Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 
450, 451–56 (1920)).  
 183. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text (summarizing the 
Court’s utilization of assertions from Theodore Roosevelt’s 1908 Proclamation 
to justify its finding that the Grand Canyon National Monument complied with 
the statute).  
 184. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142.  
 185. See id. at 141–42. 
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whether a monument designation contained the sorts of protect-
able objects encompassed by the statute—much like it did in 
Cameron.186 This further suggests that courts might have the 
authority to determine whether a President’s exercise of discre-
tion comports with the Act’s requirements, notwithstanding 
other Supreme Court precedent that bars courts from reviewing 
a discretionary executive action.187 However, Cameron and Cap-
paert may no longer be good law given that they predate that 
precedent, including the Court’s 1994 decision in Dalton v. Spec-
ter, which held that courts cannot review challenges to a Presi-
dent’s discretionary action made pursuant to a congressional 
grant of authority.188 
Simply put, the question of review remains unanswered. 
Even assuming that the power of federal courts encompasses the 
authority to review a presidential monument designation, the 
waters remain muddy because the Court has also failed to ex-
plicitly define the appropriate standard of review.189 As a result, 
lower federal courts have been left without clear guidance about 
which standard of review to apply.  
3. Takeaways from the Supreme Court’s Antiquities Act 
Jurisprudence 
To summarize, the minimal Supreme Court case law dealing 
with presidential power and discretion under the Antiquities Act 
imparts several lessons.  
First, it is unclear whether the Court would sanction judicial 
review of a President’s decision to designate a national monu-
ment because the statute grants the Executive Branch discretion 
in making this determination.190 On one hand, the Court’s will-
ingness to engage in a limited review in Cameron and Cappaert 
to ensure that the challenged monuments complied with the 
 
 186. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (asserting that the Court 
made the same type of implicit assumption). 
 187. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994); United States v. George 
S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940) (“[N]o question of law is raised when 
the exercise of the President’s discretion is challenged.”); Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. 
v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919) (explaining that a claim is beyond the 
scope of judicial power when it is premised on an abuse of discretion by the 
Legislative or Executive Branch).  
 188. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 476. 
 189. See Cappaert, 252 U.S. at 141–42; Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 
450, 455–56 (1920). 
 190. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2012).  
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Act’s requirement signals it would sanction some degree of re-
view. The fact that it ruled unanimously in both cases bolsters 
this position further.191 However, critics can point to more recent 
case law that forecloses judicial review of a discretionary execu-
tive action.192 Given this jurisprudence and the Court’s current 
makeup, it ultimately seems more likely that the Court would 
defer to the President’s discretion and foreclose judicial review 
of his monument designations. But as it currently stands, 
whether by the Court or Congress, further clarification of this 
issue is certainly needed.  
Second, even assuming that judicial review is possible, the 
Court has left parties to guess what the proper standard of re-
view is. Because of this, Part III proposes a standard of review 
for the courts to apply in Antiquities Act cases.  
Finally, because the Court has not had the opportunity to 
hear a challenge to a designation on the grounds that it did not 
comply with the Act’s “smallest area” requirement, it is unset-
tled whether the Act commits compliance with this limitation 
solely to the President’s discretion. And, even if this requirement 
does lend itself to judicially manageable standards, it is unclear 
whether the Act affords a challenge based on this provision the 
same standard of review that an “objects of historic or scientific 
interest” claim would receive.  
C. CIRCUIT COURT CASES INTERPRETING THE ANTIQUITIES ACT  
Both circuit court cases confronting challenges to the Presi-
dent’s authority to designate national monuments were decided 
by the D.C. Circuit on the same day. These cases are: Mountain 
States Legal Foundation v. Bush193 and Tulare County v. 
Bush.194  
1. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush 
In Mountain States, the court addressed a challenge to six 
of Clinton’s national monument designations.195 The appellants 
argued that the district court erred in not engaging in a more 
thorough review beyond mere facial consideration of whether the 
 
 191. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128; Cameron, 252 U.S. 450. Interestingly, two 
seemingly conflicting cases—Cameron and Dakota Central—were decided in the 
same year. 
 192. See, e.g., Dalton, 511 U.S. at 476.  
 193. 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
 194. 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 195. Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1133–34.  
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monument designations exceeded the President’s authority un-
der the Antiquities Act.196 But the circuit court declined the op-
portunity to address “the availability or scope of judicial review 
of a Presidential Proclamation designating federal lands as a na-
tional monument under the Antiquities Act.”197 It did so on the 
grounds that the appellants had “failed to present any factual 
allegation sufficient to warrant review of its ultra vires claim.”198 
Put another way, the court held that it could not reach the ques-
tion of the scope of judicial review because the appellant’s com-
plaint did not allege facts suggesting Clinton exceeded his stat-
utory authority. Instead, the court found the plaintiffs’ 
complaint only contained “legal conclusion[s] couched as factual 
allegation[s].”199 
Despite noting that the Supreme Court has never pro-
claimed the standard of review applicable to Antiquities Act 
challenges,200 the court did find that “the Supreme Court has in-
dicated generally that review is available to ensure that the 
Proclamations are consistent with constitutional principles and 
that the President has not exceeded his statutory authority.”201 
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit carved out an exception to the gen-
eral rule of deference to a President’s discretion based on sepa-
ration of powers principles when an “authorizing statute or an-
other statute places discernible limits on the President’s 
discretion.”202 There, the court found that, “[j]udicial review in 
such instances does not implicate separation of powers concerns 
to the same degree as where the statute did not at all limit the 
discretion of the President.”203 
Coupled together, these two statements indicate that the 
D.C. Circuit might be willing to entertain a claim that an execu-
tive monument designation exceeded the limits of the Presi-
dent’s authority because it violated the statute’s limitations on 
his or her discretion. Here, that would mean the designation ei-
ther did not (1) contain protectable objects or (2) comply with the 
 
 196. Id. at 1133.  
 197. Id. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. at 1137. 
 200. Id. at 1135.  
 201. Id. at 1136.  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
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“smallest area compatible” requirement.204 But in order to pro-
ceed, a party would need to include factual allegations in its com-
plaint that satisfied the court. Given the deference courts afford 
to executive actions made pursuant to a statute, this presents an 
acute burden for a plaintiff to overcome.  
Finally, on a related note, the Court found that the Antiqui-
ties Act did not violate the non-delegation doctrine because it in-
cluded “intelligible principles to guide the President’s actions.”205 
These same principles—the objects of historic/scientific interest 
and “smallest area compatible” requirements—could be used to 
cabin in the President’s discretion and allow for judicial review 
when alleged violations occur. 
2. Tulare County v. Bush 
The other circuit court case implicating a question of presi-
dential authority under the Antiquities Act was Tulare County 
v. Bush.206 This case, which involved a challenge of Clinton’s des-
ignation of Grand Sequoia National Monument, had a disposi-
tion similar to Mountain States.207 Relying on the same princi-
ples it espoused in Mountain States, the court held that the 
appellant failed to plead a basis for “ultra vires” review of the 
Proclamation.”208 It did address several points, however, that did 
not arise in Mountain States.  
First, the court dismissed the appellant’s claim that the An-
tiquities Act requires a “certain level of detail” in presidential 
monument designations.209 Second, pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Cappaert v. United States,210 the court found 
that “ecosystems and scenic vistas” fall within the boundaries of 
protectable objects under the Antiquities Act.211 This suggests a 
rather broad conception of what constitutes an object of interest 
under the Act.  
 
 204. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012).  
 205. Mountain States, 306 F.3d. at 1137.  
 206. 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
 207. Id. at 1140.  
 208. Id. at 1144 (quoting Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1136–37).  
 209. Id. at 1141.  
 210. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).  
 211. Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1142. This also aligns with the types of ob-
jects that the President sought to protect in his monument designations. For 
example, enlarging Glacier Bay National Monument protected two of “the oldest 
plant communities in southeast Alaska.” Proclamation No. 4618, 43 Fed. Reg. 
57,073, 57,073 (Dec. 1, 1978). 
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Third, while the court dismissed the appellant’s argument 
that the monument was not the smallest area compatible to pro-
tect the objects of interest, it did so on the grounds that the ap-
pellants failed to make factual allegations to support its claim—
namely that it failed to identify “the improperly designated lands 
with sufficient particularity to state a claim.”212 Notably, the 
court could have resolved the “smallest area compatible” claim 
by rejecting the appellant’s argument that the President abused 
his discretion on the grounds that the President’s application of 
discretion was non-reviewable. Stated differently, the court 
could have found that the Act committed the “smallest area com-
patible” requirement to the President’s discretion. This alterna-
tive basis could have implicated the Supreme Court’s previous 
ruling that unconstrained discretion committed to the legislative 
or Executive Branch is not reviewable.213 By not doing so, the 
court left open the possibility that compliance with the Act’s size 
requirement may be subject to judicial review.214 Finally, the 
court determined that presidential actions are not subject to re-
view under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).215 As a re-
sult, Congress should explicitly provide for a standard of judicial 
review under the Antiquities Act to quell confusion among the 
courts.216 
D. DISTRICT COURT CASES INTERPRETING THE ANTIQUITIES ACT  
Among the suits involving challenges to national monument 
designations by the President, many have been decided in fed-
eral district courts. An examination of these cases provides a 
greater understanding of how courts have grappled with these 
challenges and what contributions they have made to the dis-
course about judicial review in Antiquities Act cases. 
 
 212. Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1142.  
 213. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994).  
 214. It remains an open question if that review is limited to facial consider-
ations. 
 215. Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1143 (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 
U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992)); see Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800–01 (“The President is 
not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview, but he is not explicitly included, 
either. Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional 
position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to subject 
the President to the provisions of the APA. We would require an express state-
ment by Congress before assuming it intended the President’s performance of 
his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).  
 216. See infra Part III.  
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1. Wyoming v. Franke 
Wyoming v. Franke217 concerned a challenge to FDR’s crea-
tion of Jackson Hole National Monument. Among other claims, 
the State of Wyoming argued that the monument violated the 
Antiquities Act because it did not contain “objects of an [sic] his-
toric or scientific interest” and was “not confined to the smallest 
area compatible with the proper care and management of a Na-
tional Monument.”218 In its defense, the federal government re-
sponded that (1) the executive action was not subject to judicial 
review, and (2) that it nonetheless complied with the “scope and 
purpose” of the Act.219 Notwithstanding the government’s first 
assertion, the court found that it possessed “limited jurisdiction 
to investigate and determine whether or not the Proclamation is 
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of power under the Antiqui-
ties Act so as to be outside of the scope and purpose of that Act 
by which the President . . . has exceeded or violated a discretion 
thereby conferred.”220 
To that end, the court heard extensive evidence from both 
parties on the issue of whether the withdrawn land constituting 
the monument contained “historic landmarks, historic or prehis-
toric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific inter-
est.”221 After considering the evidence, the court determined that 
the federal government satisfied its burden of showing that the 
President’s exercise of discretion was not arbitrary and capri-
cious.222 This was despite the court’s declaration that it would 
have found that the objects requirement was not fulfilled if pre-
ponderance of the evidence was the standard of review.223 It con-
tinued by remarking that this lower burden was due to the “lim-
ited scope” that it elucidated earlier.224 In concluding its 
decision, the court explained that this dispute was essentially a 
 
 217. 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).  
 218. Id. at 892. The state also claimed that FDR’s action was “an at-
tempt . . . to substitute, through the Antiquities Act, a National Monument for 
a National Park, the creation of which is within the sole province of the Con-
gress, thereby becoming an evasion of the law governing the segregation of such 
areas.” Id. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. at 894 (emphasis added).  
 221. Id. at 895.  
 222. See id. at 895–96.  
 223. Id.  
 224. Id. at 896. 
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controversy between Congress and the President and it was in-
cumbent on Congress to pass “remedial legislation” if it disa-
greed with how the Executive Branch was utilizing the Antiqui-
ties Act.225  
Franke is significant in Antiquities Act jurisprudence for 
several reasons. One, it was the first instance of a court articu-
lating a standard of review for challenges to national monument 
designations made by the President. Here, the court determined 
that arbitrary and capricious review applied.226  
Two, despite articulating this standard, its process of rea-
soning suggests that plaintiffs would find difficulty in charging 
a violation of the Act. Short of turning a barren field227 into a 
monument, Presidents will always win lawsuits under this 
standard of review. This hands-off approach by the courts mim-
ics (to a degree) the jurisprudence of complete deference set forth 
in cases such as Dalton v. Specter228 and United States v. George 
S. Bush & Co.229 But it does stop just short of that absolute rule.  
Finally, and perhaps the most important takeaway, the 
court noted the judicial review analysis applies equally to the 
“smallest area compatible”230 requirement.231 Here, that means 
courts will give near-absolute deference to presidential discre-
tion regarding what amount of land is necessary to effectuate the 
protection of landmarks, structures, and other historical or sci-
entific objects. However, under the Franke court’s formulation, 
courts would still possess a limited ability to ensure that a Pres-
ident was not acting arbitrarily or capriciously when demarcat-
ing a monument’s boundaries.232  
 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. The court here referenced “a bare stretch of sage-brush prairie in regard 
to which there was no substantial evidence that it contained objects of historic 
or scientific interest” as an example of a monument which would violate the 
objects requirement of the Act. Id. at 895.  
 228. 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994).  
 229. 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940).  
 230. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012).  
 231. Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896.  
 232. Id. at 894. 
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2. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus 
Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus233 involved a challenge to 
Carter’s controversial Alaskan monument designations. Once 
again, the District Court of Alaska, like all other courts that have 
confronted Antiquities Act claims, found in favor of the federal 
government.234 In finding for the defendants, the court explained 
that Carter’s designations complied with the Act’s requirements 
and that the text of the statute, legislative history, and the Pres-
ident’s evolving use of the monument designation power over the 
more than seventy years since the Antiquities Act was passed 
supported this conclusion.235 The court was also persuaded by 
Congress’s failure to rein in the President’s expanding monu-
ment designation power in the Federal Land Management and 
Policy Act of 1976, which left the President’s Antiquities Act 
powers conspicuously untouched.236  
Despite finding for the government, the court in Anaconda 
Copper also elucidated some principles that hemmed in execu-
tive authority.237 For example, the court determined that the Act 
instituted limitations on the types of objects which the President 
could protect with a national monument.238 Likewise, the court 
determined that the President did not possess the authority to 
designate unlimited amounts of land because the Act placed lim-
itations on his or her power through the “smallest area compat-
ible” requirement.239 It is unclear, however, how the court con-
ceived of meaningfully constraining a legally questionable 
monument designation given its reluctance “to determine the 
standard of judicial review which shall apply in many factual 
determinations by the President.”240 Presumably, the amount of 
 
 233. No. A79-161, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17861, at *2 (D. Alaska June 26, 
1980).  
 234. Id. at *9–10.  
 235. Id. at *10.  
 236. Id. at *6; see Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743. This bill overhauled the executive authority in the 
sphere of public lands law but failed to amend the Antiquities Act.  
 237. 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17861, at *2. 
 238. See id. (“I believe that there are limits on the authority granted to the 
President by Section 2 of the Act; that those limitations I think, arise by reason 
of the definition of the objects which may be made or for which Proclamations 
may issue to preserve and protect such objects found on government land.”).  
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at *9.  
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land necessary to effectuate the purposes of a monument protec-
tion falls with the factual determinations accorded to the Presi-
dent. 
In the end, Anaconda Copper’s impact is similar to that of 
Franke. It recognized limitations on the President’s monument 
designation power, but, like Franke, its practical implications for 
restraining executive overreach in violation of those limitations 
are underwhelming. And, unlike Franke, the Anaconda Copper 
court failed to even define the relevant standard of review.241 Ul-
timately, the case does little in the way of demystifying for par-
ties how courts would review a challenge to a presidentially-des-
ignated national monument; except for demonstrating that a 
court would defer heavily to the Executive Branch. 
3. Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Ross 
In Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Ross,242 the plain-
tiffs challenged Obama’s designation of Northeast Canyons and 
Seamounts Marine National Monument.243 Before reaching the 
merits, the court engaged in a robust discussion about the vari-
ous aspects of reviewability pertinent to the case’s disposition.244 
On this issue, the court began by disagreeing with the govern-
ment’s assertion that presidential monument designations are 
non-reviewable because “sole discretion” is entrusted to the Pres-
ident.245 Citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States 
v. California, Cappaert v. United States, and Cameron v. United 
States, the court explained that monument designations are gen-
erally reviewable “[b]ecause Plaintiffs’ claims assert that the 
President exceeded his statutory authority under the Antiquities 
Act — i.e., that the Proclamation was ultra vires.”246 The court’s 
assertion thus provides ammunition for the proposition that 
there is at least a baseline authority for courts to review monu-
ment challenges and that such review does not improperly in-
trude upon the powers of the presidency.  
But the court continued on to differentiate between the 
question of whether review exists and what the appropriate 
 
 241. Id.  
 242. 349 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. 2018).  
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scope of review is.247 It is in this latter question which the court 
confronted uncertainty. First, it noted that some inquiries can 
be adjudicated on the face of the claim “resembl[ing] the sort of 
statutory interpretation with which courts are familiar.”248 By 
way of example, it explained that considering whether an ar-
chaeological site qualifies as an “object of historic or scientific 
interest”—as the Cappaert Court did—qualified as such an in-
quiry.249 
On the other hand, the court explained that other inquiries, 
like whether an object was historic or scientific, or whether the 
“smallest area compatible” requirement was satisfied, required 
factual determinations which may be beyond the authority of the 
court to review.250 The court specifically noted that it was ques-
tionable whether it could even engage in review of the claim that 
Obama’s designation failed to comply with the Act’s mandate 
that a monument “be confined to the smallest area compatible 
with the proper care and management of the objects to be pro-
tected.”251 The court explained that its ability to review such a 
claim would involve “considering the facts underlying the Presi-
dent’s determination” and that such an inquiry may be barred 
by precedent, thus suggesting that discretionary executive ac-
tions are not reviewable.252 Moreover, the court determined that 
it was unnecessary to decide whether judicial review was avail-
able for the “smallest area” requirement because the plaintiffs 
had failed to offer “sufficient factual allegations to succeed” on 
the merits of their claim.253 The court did find, however, that re-
view could be possible, but “only if the plaintiff were to offer plau-
sible and detailed factual allegations that the President acted 
beyond the boundaries of authority that Congress set.”254 
The primary takeaways from Massachusetts Lobstermen’s 
Ass’n are twofold. One, judicial review in Antiquities Act cases is 
itself available.255 But two, the scope of such review is uncertain 
 
 247. Id. at 54–55. 
 248. Id.  
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 251. Id.; see 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012).  
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ter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 (1994).  
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for the Act’s twin requirements.256 Nevertheless, the court found 
that it was unnecessary to determine the appropriate standard 
of review because the plaintiffs failed to make specific factual 
allegations that Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine Na-
tional Monument was not confined to the smallest area possi-
ble.257 
To answer the uncertainties noted in the preceding analysis 
of Antiquities Act jurisprudence—namely whether judicial re-
view is available and, if so, what the standard of review should 
be—this Note now turns to Part III. Part III describes a proposed 
legislative solution which clarifies the courts’ power to review 
Antiquities Act challenges as well as the appropriate standard 
of review—depending on the type of challenge—to apply.  
III.  THE SOLUTION TO A MONUMENTAL PROBLEM: A 
LEGISLATIVE REMEDY   
As it currently stands, there are two overarching issues in 
Antiquities Act jurisprudence that remain open for debate: (1) 
whether federal courts are authorized to review challenges to na-
tional monument designations made by the President pursuant 
to his or her powers under the Act and, (2) assuming federal 
courts do possess this authority, what is the appropriate stand-
ard of review that courts should employ. 
This Part addresses these issues in order—first, by answer-
ing in the affirmative that federal courts should be definitively 
authorized to review challenges to national monument designa-
tions, and second, by proposing that Congress should amend the 
Act to include a standard of review which reinforces the statute’s 
role as a preservation tool while still adhering to the limitations 
that Congress placed on the President’s use of that power.  
Finally, this Part differentiates actions taken by the Presi-
dent which result in the reduction or revocation of national mon-
uments. These actions, such as those initiated by Trump,258 im-
plicate separation of powers principles generally, and the third 
prong of Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework specifically.259 
When reviewing challenges to monument reductions or revoca-
tions, courts should be especially skeptical of the President’s use 
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of the Antiquities Act in this manner because, as we will see, 
Congress has arguably signaled its disagreement with such a 
practice. Accordingly, Congress should also clarify that the Pres-
ident may not reduce or revoke a prior national monument des-
ignation. 
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ANTIQUITIES ACT CHALLENGES 
Although some lower courts have held that the Supreme 
Court implicitly adopted the position that judicial review is 
available in Antiquities Act challenges,260 the Court has never 
explicitly answered this question in the affirmative. Moreover, 
cases—decided subsequent to the most recent case involving the 
Act—such as Dalton v. Specter have set forth the principle that 
when a statute grants the President discretion, courts lack the 
power to review challenges to the exercise of that discretion.261 
Because the Antiquities Act undoubtedly grants the President 
discretion in creating or enlarging national monuments, the 
Court’s most recent precedent suggests that these decisions are 
non-reviewable.262 Even taken in the light most favorable to the 
pro-review camp, the answer is ambiguous at best. Therefore, it 
would behoove Congress to bring clarity to this corner of the law 
by enunciating that federal courts do indeed have the power to 
review Antiquities Act challenges.263 Doing so would reinforce 
the separation of powers by providing a check on executive au-
thority.  
To achieve this, Congress should look to the reasoning in 
cases like Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush264 and 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich.265 In those 
cases, the D.C. Circuit qualified the deference afforded to the 
President by limiting Dalton to statutes that place no “discerni-
ble limits on the President’s discretion.”266 The corollary is that 
if a statute does place limitations on the President’s discretion, 
then a court can engage in review to ensure constitutional and 
statutory provisions are met. And the Antiquities Act certainly 
contains such limitations—namely the protectable objects and 
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“smallest area compatible” requirements.267 Congress should 
clarify that these twin requirements bestow the power of review 
upon the courts.  
It is also important for Congress to clarify that courts may 
review Antiquities Act challenges in order to enforce the separa-
tion of powers between Congress and the President. Because 
Congress delegated a portion of its plenary power under the 
Property Clause268 to designate national monuments, and it did 
so while also instituting restrictions on that power, allowing 
courts to review challenges alleging violations of those re-
strictions helps to insulate Congress’s plenary authority.  
B. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Answering the question of whether judicial review is avail-
able, however, only addresses a threshold matter. To truly di-
minish the current ambiguity, it is imperative for Congress to 
also clarify the appropriate standard of review in Antiquities Act 
cases. This Note proposes that Congress adopt different stand-
ards of review, as described in the following three sections, de-
pending on the type of challenge brought.  
1. Broad Categorizations 
The Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Ass’n court made a helpful 
distinction between the types of claims a party could bring in an 
Antiquities Act lawsuit. It distinguished between claims that in-
volve typical statutory interpretation and those that challenged 
the President’s exercise of discretion.269 The former type can 
most aptly be described as broad categorizations, e.g., archaeo-
logical sites, ecosystems, animal species, etc. These categoriza-
tions are tied to the first requirement of the Act that limits pro-
tectable objects to “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric 
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest.”270 
Congress should amend the Antiquities Act to clarify that courts 
have the power to determine whether a categorization like those 
listed above comports with the protectable objects requirement. 
However, courts should defer to the President’s determination 
regarding whether a particular object itself falls within the tax-
onomy of a categorization, i.e., whether it is an archaeological 
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site, ecosystem, etc. Admittedly, this may be a distinction with-
out a difference that will merely incentivize Presidents to shoe-
horn objects into a category which courts have already found con-
stitutes a landmark, structure, or historic/scientific object. But 
this would at least force the President to rationalize his or her 
use of discretion and explain why the Antiquities Act covers the 
object to be protected.  
In addition to engaging in typical statutory interpretation 
for these types of challenges, courts should also acknowledge and 
incorporate the evolving use of the Antiquities Act by Presidents 
since its passage to inform their decisions. For example, courts 
should heed signs of congressional acquiescence to monuments 
created by Presidents to protect objects like ecosystems. Alt-
hough some courts have found objects falling within this catego-
rization are covered by the Antiquities Act,271 to prevent back-
sliding, courts should appreciate the fact that Congress has 
acquiesced to the evolution of the Act through legislation like 
ANILCA (which codified Carter’s Alaska monument designa-
tions).272 Essentially, a reviewing court’s analysis should utilize 
the framework from the second prong of Justice Jackson’s con-
currence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer which de-
termined that congressional acquiescence is grounds for “inde-
pendent presidential responsibility.”273 As applied, this would 
call for judicial deference to the President’s determination that 
a broad categorization like ecosystems or animal species quali-
fies for the protections a national monument affords.  
2. Landmarks, Structures, and Objects of Historic or Scientific 
Interest 
Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Ass’n also provides a useful 
framework for evaluating whether, rather than a broad catego-
rization, a particular object in a proposed national monument 
qualifies as a landmark, structure, or is of historic or scientific 
interest. In this instance, that court found that it was beyond the 
purview of the judiciary’s expertise to determine whether, for ex-
 
 271. See, e.g., Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, No. A79-161, 1980 U.S. Dist. 
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ample, an object was historic or scientific enough to justify pro-
tection via a national monument.274 This approach is sensible. 
Therefore, in amending the Antiquities Act to clarify judicial re-
view, Congress should also direct courts to afford near-absolute 
deference to a President’s determination that an object is historic 
or scientific enough to warrant protection. This aligns with the 
purpose of the Act to preserve national treasures before they are 
permanently destroyed.275 In addition, Congress should also 
clarify that a good faith effort to justify protection of the object 
in a presidential proclamation is sufficient to invoke deference 
by the courts.  
Congress should institute this standard of review because 
the President is better equipped than the judiciary to gather and 
evaluate the facts required to make these monument designa-
tions as well as analyze the political considerations which accom-
pany them.276 Although some might claim that using near-abso-
lute deference eviscerates the practicality of judicial review and 
freezes in place illegitimate monuments, Congress still possesses 
the authority to regulate public lands.277 Its constitutional pow-
ers would allow it to revoke a designation,278 or even defund a 
monument,279 to nullify an unpopular designation.280 
3. Smallest Area Compatible 
Effectuating the purposes of the Antiquities Act requires 
balancing the need to protect national treasures and the land 
required to accomplish this task with the policy of productively 
using federal lands. To help control this balance, the Act’s 
“smallest area compatible” requirement281 ensures that just 
enough land is withdrawn to protect landmarks, structures, or 
objects of historic or scientific interest—no more, no less. In pass-
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ing the Act, Congress granted the President discretion to deter-
mine how much land was necessary to fulfill this policy of preser-
vation. Yet there may be instances in which a President makes 
a determination about the amount of lands necessary to preserve 
our national treasures that conflicts with the purposes of the Act. 
It is for this reason that courts should have greater authority to 
review claims that the smallest area requirement was violated. 
Accordingly, with regards to the “smallest area compatible” re-
quirement, Congress should amend the Act to institute arbitrary 
and capricious review for this class of claims. Following the lead 
of the Franke and Mountain States courts, this standard of re-
view would allow courts to engage in a limited review that allows 
parties to plead factual allegations suggesting that the President 
could have protected designated objects with a smaller footprint 
(or even that the protection of objects required more lands than 
were designated). Using this standard of review would balance 
the need to defer to the President’s discretion while also giving 
parties with legitimate grievances a chance to make their case. 
Employing this standard of review would also incentivize the 
President to gather facts, thoughtfully consider them, and inte-
grate them into the process of setting the monument’s bounda-
ries. Moreover, it would induce the President to compile a record 
capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny of a monument’s size.  
C. SPECIAL CASES—WHEN PRESIDENTS REDUCE OR REVOKE AN 
EXISTING MONUMENT  
Since passage of the Antiquities Act, several Presidents re-
duced the size of national monuments designated by their pre-
decessors.282 Although many of these actions were controversial, 
they went unchallenged.283 Presently, Trump’s reduction of 
Grand Staircase-Escalante284 and Bears Ears285 National Monu-
ments revitalized a thorny legal issue touching upon separation 
of powers principles: whether the President acts ultra vires286 
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when he or she reduces or revokes an existing monument. Alt-
hough courts have yet to rule on this question,287 they are cur-
rently considering it.288  
Answering this question affirmatively would mean that the 
President’s monument reduction would unconstitutionally in-
trude upon Congress’s plenary power under the Property 
Clause.289 Indeed, scholars argue that the answer to this ques-
tion is yes, grounding their analysis in a discussion of the Antiq-
uities Act’s differing language from other contemporary laws au-
thorizing the President to revoke or modify previous 
withdrawals of federal lands.290 In other words, they believe that 
a lack of explicit reduction or revocation authority in the Antiq-
uities Act, compared to other laws with such language, is fatal 
to executive assertions of that power. These scholars also argue 
convincingly that language in the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act (FLPMA) of 1976 barring the Secretary of the Inte-
rior from modifying or revoking any national monument desig-
nated pursuant to the Antiquities Act was a drafting error that 
was instead intended to preclude the President from taking 
those actions.291  
Because the power to reduce or revoke prior monument des-
ignations raises separation of powers issues, specifically exclu-
sive legislative power under the Property Clause, Congress’s bar 
against executive reductions or revocations seemingly implicates 
the third prong of Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework for an-
alyzing challenges to executive actions.292 That framework sug-
gests that when the President takes an action “incompatible 
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at 
its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitu-
tional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over 
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the matter.”293 Here, the President enjoys no independent exec-
utive power to designate, modify, reduce, or revoke national 
monuments. He or she may only act within the bounds of Con-
gress’s delegation of its powers to regulate federal lands. Thus, 
there is a strong argument that courts should afford no deference 
to monument reductions or revocations because Congress in-
tended to prohibit the President from taking such actions under 
Section 204(j) of the FLPMA.294  
Admittedly, however, this language is ambiguous because it 
bars the Interior Secretary, rather than the President, from re-
voking or reducing a monument. Therefore, this Note suggests 
that Congress, concurrent with the recommended statutory 
changes discussed above, should also clarify that the President 
may not reduce or revoke prior national monument designations. 
This could be accomplished by updating the statute containing 
the bar against monument reductions or revocations295 to reflect 
the following language: “The President shall not modify or re-
voke any withdrawal creating national monuments under chap-
ter 3203 of Title 54, United States Code.” Adding in this lan-
guage would support the original purpose of the Antiquities Act 
to create protections for our national treasures rather than elim-
inating them. Moreover, it would broadly advance Congress’s 
stated policy declaring that our “public lands be managed in a 
manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, histori-
cal, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water re-
source, and archeological values.”296 
  CONCLUSION   
Protecting our national treasures, whether they are man-
made or natural, is vitally important, and the Antiquities Act 
helps accomplish this goal by giving the President the ability to 
respond quickly when these treasures are threatened. By desig-
nating more than 160 national monuments since the early 20th 
century, numerous administrations have preserved our coun-
try’s beauty, historic artifacts and places, and scientific wonders 
for future generations. Since the Act’s passage, Presidents from 
Roosevelt to Carter to Obama have contributed to the evolution 
 
 293. Id. at 637.  
 294. Federal Land Policy and Management Act § 204(j). 
 295. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(j) (2012).  
 296. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).  
   
510 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:465 
 
of presidential power under the statute by designating increas-
ingly larger monuments that protect a wider swath of places and 
things. But this evolution has been controversial and has 
spurred litigation. In a number of cases, courts have wrestled 
with two primary issues: whether challenges to presidential na-
tional monument designations are reviewable, and if they are, 
what standard of review should be used. Because the Supreme 
Court’s lack of guidance in this corner of the law has puzzled 
lower courts confronting these questions, Congress should 
amend the Act to affirm the judiciary’s power to review chal-
lenges of national monuments designated by the President. Con-
gress should also clarify the standards of review of the require-
ments which cabin in the President’s discretion. Finally, it 
should clarify that the President may not reduce or revoke an 
existing national monument. Hopefully, the solutions proposed 
herein will help accomplish the goals of conservation and preser-
vation while also ensuring that the President stays within the 
boundaries Congress instituted as the regulator of our shared 
public lands.  
 
